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INTRODUCTION
More than twenty years have passed since decentralization reform started in Ja-
pan. Several items have been completed, including the abolition of agent-dele-
gated function system and the amendment of restrictions by law and ordinances 
on local governments’ discretion, in order to weaken central control over local 
governments and to enable them to create new policies suitable for the actual 
situations of local communities. Actually, some local governments have tried to 
tackle innovative policies and have succeeded in improving the welfare of their 
residents and their regions, utilizing results already attained by reform. 
  However, the remaining majority cannot capitalize on its results fully, and 
even leading local governments are not quite content with the present state in 
order to push their own business smoothly. As some scholars characterized de-
centralization reform in Japan thus far as the “unfinished project1）,” the most 
※　This article was originally presented at the session for decentralization reform and 
central-local relationship on the International Summer Conference of Korean Associa-
tion for Local Government Studies (KALGS), held in August 20th, 2016. I owe a lot to 
attendants, especially Professor Jin Hyuk Chai (Chungnam National University), Pro-
fessor Kyeong Tae Nam (Kyoto University), Professor Dong Hyun Ha (Anyang Univer-
sity), Professor Soon Chang So (Konkuk University), Professor Jin Le Hong (Local 
Government Officials Development Institute), Professor Chan Dong Kim (Chungnam 
National University), and Professor Soon Bin Im (Myongji University).
1）　Masaru Nishio, Unfinished Decentralization Reform (Mikan no Bunken Kai-
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common reason is that decentralization reform itself is still not yet completed. 
Especially, the severe criticism is often made by local governments that the local 
tax and finance system is not yet sufficiently decentralized.
  Looking back on the history of the decentralization reform in Japan, the 
agenda of the local tax and finance reform had not been totally set aside. Rather, 
it has been kept politically the most important issue, once wrestled intensively as 
so called Trinity Reform, as mentioned below. But its result was by no means sat-
isfactory for any stakeholders. Large cities, which were supposed to own rela-
tively much more administrative and financial resources than another municipali-
ties and could enjoy the benefit of decentralization reform more easily, were not 
exceptional. Even large cities remain to have serious fiscal challenges after the 
Trinity Reform, and will certainly face severer ones in near future.
  Furthermore, Japan now faces the historically first rapid and big decline of 
population and unprecedented aging society. The population decline is much 
more remarkable in rural areas than urban areas, especially three major metro-
politan areas, so that the disparity between urban and rural areas often become a 
point of dispute in relation to the financial distribution between local govern-
ments, and the problem of overconcentration in Tokyo, which is thought to im-
poverish the local economy because it makes the population migrate from rural 
areas and concentrate in Tokyo and other metropolitan areas, has come to be 
posed. Although some of the large cities still increase its population, they must 
surely face the decline of population and the increase of the population of aged 
people. 
  This paper aims to point out problems as to series of reform agenda of tax 
and financial reform for large cities, by analyzing recent revenue structure of 
eleven designated cities. While the national government tries to introduce sever-
er tax policies that target large cities, this paper shows the necessity to secure 
the financial resources for large cities.
kaku), Iwanami Shoten, 1999. 
Decentralization Reform and Changing Financial Structure of Large Cities in Japan 3
THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES 
ALLOCATION BETWEEN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Firstly, the basic structure of financial resources allocation between central and 
local governments in Japan must be explained2）.
  Figure 1 shows that the percentage taken up by local expenditures within 
the combined final total of national and local expenditures was 62.6% in fiscal 
year 2001. On the other hand, the combined total of tax revenues for central and 
local governments was 8,550 billion yen, and out of this total figure, the total fig-
2）　Kenichiro Harada, Local Taxation in Japan, Papers on the Local Governance Sys-
tem and its Implementation in Selected Fields in Japan No.10, 2009, pp.1-3; Satoru 
Ohsugi, “Promotion of decentralization reform (Chiho bunken no suisin)” in Wataru 
Ohmori and others eds. Readings for Regional Development (Jissen Machidukuri 
Tokuhon), Koshokuken, 2008, pp.75-76.
Figure 1 The basic structure of intergovernmental financial resources allocation in 
FY 2001
Source: Web site of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.
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ure for local taxation was 3,550 billion yen, showing that within the overall total 
of tax revenue, local tax revenue accounts for no more than 40%. It is the trans-
fer of funds from central government to local governments that makes it possible 
for local government expenditures to exceed those of central government de-
spite the fact that local tax revenues take up no more than 40% of the total tax 
revenue. It consists of national treasury disbursements, local allocation tax and 
others. In other words, two out of four major revenues of local governments are 
financial transfer payment from central government3）.
  Among these financial transfers, national treasury disbursements are reve-
nue granted by central government on the condition that they are used for ex-
penditure on specific projects and on policies for a specified administrative pur-
pose. It consists of a national treasury obligatory share based on the central 
government’s and a national treasury subsidy for such purposes as the promotion 
of specific policies or for financial assistance. They are restricted in the ways in 
which they can be used, hence decision-making in terms of both annual revenue 
and expenditure of these disbursements is in the hands of central government.
  The local allocation tax is distributed by the central government in order to 
equalize the difference in financial resources generated by diversity in economic 
situations, and ensure a source of revenue as required for a standard level of ser-
vice by local governments. The total amount of local allocation tax is linked to 
certain percentages (about 30%) of five national taxes, including income tax, 
corporation tax and consumption tax. The amount of the local allocation tax allo-
cated to each local government is calculated on the basis of standard financial 
needs and standard financial revenues in accordance with provisions of the local 
allocation tax law. The approximate balance between standard financial needs 
and standard financial revenues is distributed to each local government. In con-
trast to national treasury disbursements, local allocation tax, while it is stipulated 
that this revenue source is linked to national fiscal income, is treated as general 
tax revenue with no restrictions on the manner of use for local governments, so 
3）　Hiroshi Ikawa, Recent Local Financial System Reform (Trinity Reform), Up-to-
date Documents on Local Autonomy in Japan No.2, 2007, pp.2-3
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it can serve to develop local government autonomy. 
  This intergovernmental structure of financial revenue allocation explains 
why the relationship between governments in Japan can be classified as combi-
nation of the centralized and the deconcentrated from a comparative frame-
work4）. Local governments in Japan perform a much wider range of functions 
while carrying heavier burdens than those in most unitary countries, and, howev-
er, have insufficient legal authorities and financial resources. Mochida pointed 
out that expenditures channeled through local governments in Japan are the 
highest among OECD countries, higher even than among Scandinavian countries, 
even at the time decentralization reform had not yet started in Japan5）. However, 
he insisted it would be inaccurate to characterize Japan as a decentralized sys-
tem because considerable decision-making authority has tended to rest with 
central units. He paid attention not only to the deconcentrated side of the rela-
tionship between central and local governments in Japan, but to the centralized 
side, in that the central government retains legal authority and financial resourc-
es to control local governments. 
  In other words, intergovernmental relationship in Japan has been often said 
to belong to a fusion type rather than a separation one in that central and local 
governments share functions much. In these situations, the strategy toward de-
centralization reform in Japan should be to expand local governments’ own finan-
cial resources and to guarantee consistent authority from planning through de-
termination to execution, not necessarily to transfer many more functions from 
central government to local governments. 
  The explanation for why the aim of decentralization reform was required to 
put emphasis on expansion of local autonomy is generally that local governments 
4）　Satoru Ohsugi “Changing Local Government System in Japan: ‘Unfinished’ Decen-
tralization Reform and Local Revitalization” Ugur Sadioglu and Kadir Dede eds. Theo-
retical Foundations and Discussions on the Reformation Process in Local Gov-
ernments, IGI Global, 2016, pp.384-385.
5）　Mochida, N. “Taxes and Transfers in Japan’s Local Finances” In M. Muramatsu, F. 
Iqbal, and I. Kume eds., Local Government Development in Post-war Japan. Ox-
ford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001, 85-86.
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became increasingly expected to assume many more roles in each area, respond-
ing to the diverse needs of the people and socio-economic changes such as glo-
balization, population decline, reduced birthrate, the aging of society, and ad-
vances in the ICT revolution. Actually, as the intergovernmental system has 
already become much less concentrated, decentralization reform mainly focused 
on weakening central control and giving financial resources to local governments. 
TRINITY REFORM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
Although, throughout the first period of decentralization reform, such significant 
items as the abolition of agent-delegated function system had been completed, 
few results were delivered in the field of local tax and finance system reform, so 
that local governments and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication 
hoped further reform to change local tax and finance system. The Decentraliza-
tion Promotion Committee announced in their final report in 2001 that the sec-
ondary decentralization reform should be started, in order to reduce the gap be-
tween local tax revenue and annual expenditure of local governments on the 
basis of the principle of “revenue neutrality” whereby the national treasury sub-
sidies and obligatory shares and local allocation tax are reduced.
  Trinity Reform was decided to start when the Koizumi Cabinet endorsed the 
paper titled “Basic policies for economic and fiscal management and structural 
reform 2002,” which stated the government policy “to discuss the pattern that 
should be achieved through trinity reform in terms of the allocation of tax sourc-
es including national treasury subsidies and obligatory shares, local allocation 
tax, and the transfer of tax revenue sources, and to prepare a reform proposal 
including the most desirable outcome and a specific reform schedule for achiev-
ing this, within one year.” Following “Basic policies for economic and fiscal man-
agement and structural reform 2003” prescribed the framework and plan of Trin-
ity Reform concretely, and then Trinity reform had been implemented for three 
fiscal years, 2004-2007, as shown in Figure 2.
  As the political process of Trinity Reform was so complicated to be men-
tioned in detail, several comments on its results must be pointed out.
Decentralization Reform and Changing Financial Structure of Large Cities in Japan 7
  Firstly, most of the local governments were dissatisfied with the conse-
quences that the reform plan prepared by six national associations of local gov-
ernments in accordance with the request made by the central government was 
not highly esteemed. The system of national treasury disbursements was hardly 
revised enough from the viewpoint of improving the expansion of the freedom of 
local governments in determining their own policies. For example, reducing the 
national treasury disbursements through the reduction of subsidy share levels 
such as the national treasury obligatory share of compulsory education expenses 
and state liabilities for child allowances was far from decentralization-oriented 
on the contrary, because it can increase the expense of general financial source 
for local governments to bear in the course of the execution of subsidy projects6）.
  Furthermore, Trinity Reform was executed in the way that substantial 
amount of local revenue sources was significantly reduced, so that it has become 
difficult for local governments to manage financially. Surely, unprecedented 
amount, about three trillion yen, of the transfer of tax revenue sources was real-
ized, but, at the same time, the sum of 4,666 billion yen in national treasury dis-
bursements was abolished or converted to grants, and the amount of substantial 
local allocation tax including the extraordinary financial measures loan com-
6）　Ikawa, op. cit., pp.13-14; Ohsugi, “Promotion of decentralization reform” pp.80-82.
Figure 2　Reform on national treasury disbursments
Source: Web site of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.
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prised the significant reduction from 23.9 trillion yen (the fiscal 2003 budget) to 
18.8 trillion yen (the fiscal 2006 budget). The amount of reduction of revenue 
was so severe that not a few municipalities gave up their own autonomous and 
independent management and chose the alternative of merger with neighbor 
municipalities.
  Generally speaking, throughout Trinity Reform, priorities were put on realiz-
ing the sound fiscal management, which could contribute the promotion of na-
tional structural reform, rather than on expanding local autonomy in the field of 
local tax and financial system. It can be said these consequences were reflected 
by bureaucratic politics inside government. The Ministry of Finance prefers to 
reduce the intervention of national ministries in local governments by abolishing 
strictly conditional subsidies in alliance with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communication, on the one hand, but, at the same time, is against expansion of 
local finance because it is giving priority to national fiscal reconstruction from 
the perspective of structural reform, on the other. The Ministry of Finance, ally-
ing itself with business, won the prime minister’s office over to its own side to 
take initiative on the process of Trinity Reform, superior to the Ministry of Inter-
nal Affairs and Communication and local governments.
CHANGING FISCAL ENVIRONMENT AROUND LARGE 
CITIES
Another confrontation between fiscal reform must be pointed. This is often 
called the problem of disparities between urban and rural7）. Among local govern-
ments, for example, over the issue of tax revenue distribution, urban areas, espe-
cially metropolitan areas like Tokyo, are in conflict with rural areas, because the 
tax revenue sources are unevenly distributed. These conflicts became obvious 
7）　Satoru Ohsugi, “Local revitalization and ‘urban and rural’ in the age of population 
decline (Jinko gensho jidainiokeru chiho sousei to toshi to chiho)” Setagaya Jichi Sei-
saku Kenkyujo ed. Journal of Urban Social Studies (Toshi shakai kenkyu), No.8, 
pp.1-2.
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especially after Trinity Reform.
  Attempting to correct the uneven distribution of tax revenue sources be-
tween urban and rural, central government recently introduced mainly two tax 
policies. One of them was local special tax on corporation in order to change part 
of enterprise tax on corporations to national tax. The other was local tax on cor-
poration in order to put part of corporate residence tax into funds for local allo-
cation tax, along with the abolition of local special tax on corporation and the in-
crease of consumption tax up to 10%.
  Another example is the introduction of so called hometown tax. This is a 
kind of tax credit to directly subtract certain amount from local residence tax, 
depending on the amount of donations to local governments where taxpayers no 
longer reside in. Hometown tax has been developing transfer effect of tax reve-
nue from metropolitan areas to rural areas. The government upgraded hometown 
tax to be applied to the donation by corporations starting from this year. 
  Tokyo Metropolitan Government has got most largely damaged among local 
governments, estimated loss amounting to more than one trillion yen since the 
creation of local special tax on corporation in 2008. It strongly dissented and crit-
icized the national tax policies as irrational, in that these measures are in opposi-
tion to the benefit principle of taxation; efforts to revitalize local economy taken 
by local governments would not pay off to be deprived of by national tax; conflict 
would be created between local governments; judging only from comparison of 
disparities of tax revenue is one-sided view, and so on8）. In addition, Tokyo 
pointed out huge fiscal demand, firstly because of being large city, secondly be-
cause of responding to the declining birthrate and aging society, and thirdly be-
cause of increasing the fiscal demand of Tokyo by expansion of the expense re-
lated to social security.
  The Association of Mayors of Designated Cities also opposes local special 
tax on corporation and insists on integrated revision including tax source trans-
fer from central government and expansion of tax revenue source to correct fis-
cal disparities between local governments. 
8）　See http://www.zaimu.metro.tokyo.jp/syukei1/zaisei/270915syutyou.pdf.
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ANALYSING FISCAL PERFORMANCE OF ELEVEN 
DESIGNATED CITIES
As mentioned above, series of local tax and financial reforms, including Trinity 
Reform and the consecutive revisions of taxation, would not necessarily meet the 
purpose of decentralization to enlarge local fiscal autonomy, especially from the 
view point of local governments. Observing the recent transition of revenue set-
tlement of all municipalities, starting from FY2003, a year before Trinity Reform 
started, we can recognize the temporal effects of Trinity Reform (Figure 3). Cer-
tainly, during Trinity Reform, 2004-2007, the index number of local tax increased 
and that of national treasury disbursements and local allocation tax decreased. 
However, we can make sure that, after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers hap-
pened, not only the index number of local tax lowered, but that of national trea-
sury disbursements dramatically soared. In fact, the ratio of the amount of local 
tax to the amount of revenue settlement of all municipalities even fell below the 
base year 2003 after the Great East Japan Earthquake (Figure 4). 
  Now let us consider if the same would hold good of large cities. Eleven large 
cities would be examined here, which became designated cities before 2003, ex-
Figure 3　Transition of revenue settlement of municipalities（FY2003=100）
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Source: Drawn from the data on the web site of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.
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cluding Saitama, because of merging a city in 2005, and Sendai, because of con-
sidering the direct influence of the Great East Japan Earthquake.
  According to the recent financial performances by eleven designated cities, 
the following can be pointed out. Firstly, the trend of the transition of local tax as 
to all municipalities is also applicable to that as to designated cities (Figure 5&6). 
  However, focusing on the ratio of local tax to revenue settlement, three cit-
ies located in Tokyo metropolitan region and Nagoya clearly have higher stan-
dard than the others (Figure 7). This depends on the ratio of local residence tax 
to the total revenue (Figure 8). 
  Local residence tax consists of individual and corporation parts. Let us take 
up three points of time, 2003, 2008 and 2013, and compare eleven designated cit-
ies as to the transition of the combination of the local individual residence tax 
revenue per capita and the ratio of it to the total revenue (Figure 9), and also the 
transition of the combination of the local corporation tax revenue per capita and 
the ratio of it to the total revenue (Figure 10).
  All those cities, with only one exception of Osaka, have higher ratio of local 
individual residence tax than those of local corporation residence tax to the total 
revenue. This tendency is particularly remarkable among three cities located in 
Figure 4　Ratio to revenue settlement of municipalities
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Figure 5　Transition of  local tax/11designated cities （FY2003=100）
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Figure 6　Transition of residence tax/11designated cities （FY2003=100）
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Tokyo metropolitan region. Conversely, it shows the fact that Osaka depends on 
local corporation tax much more than other cities. 
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Figure 7　Ration of local tax to revenue settlement/11designated cities 
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Figure 8　Ratio of residence tax to revenue settlement/11designated cities 
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Figure ９　Individual residence tax: per capita/ the ratio of revenue settlement
Source: See Figure 3.
Figure 10　Corporation tax: per capita/ the ratio of revenue settlement
Source: See Figure 3.
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CONCLUSION
This paper gave an explanation of the short history of the local tax and financial 
reform after decentralization reform started, and then made analysis of the finan-
cial performance of eleven large cities to focus on local residence tax revenue.
  It can be called to mind that new reform initiatives on large city system were 
proposed one after the other a few years after Trinity Reform has finished. One 
of the major examples is “Osaka Metropolis” initiative and another one is “Special 
Autonomous City” initiative9）. 
  As to the “Osaka Metropolis” initiative, the Special Wards system, which had 
in point of fact been specified in the Local Autonomy Law with Tokyo only in 
mind, would be applied to the Osaka metropolitan area, in order to eliminate ad-
ministrative duplication between Osaka Prefecture and Osaka City, to respond 
adequately to the administrative needs of a much wider Osaka metropolitan area 
than Osaka City. In the residential referendum, held on May 17, 2015, voters nar-
rowly decided not to introduce the “Osaka Metropolis” system after all.
  Another initiative, the “Special Autonomous City,” belongs to the same cate-
gory as the Special City system, into which Seoul Special City is classified. This 
initiative was proposed by Yokohama and some other designated cities to dis-
solve the “two-fold administration” problem completely by separating those cit-
ies from prefectures to be independent. As the Research Council for Local Gov-
ernment System, set under the prime minister, was not necessarily positively 
inclined to advance the realization of the Special City system, it suggested rather 
that priority should be given to promoting the devolution of functions and fiscal 
resources from prefectures to designated cities as much as possible, so that the 
designated cities would in effect be transformed into special cities. In fact, sever-
al important functions, including teachers’ salary payments and the set number 
of staff, permission to establish hospitals, and various city planning items, were 
devolved from prefectures to the designated cities together with measures aimed 
at securing financial resources by legislation. However, its initiative itself was 
9）　Ohsugi “Changing Local Government System in Japan” pp.390-391.
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shelved.
  These two major initiatives, both defeated after all, wouldn’t accidentally 
happen to be proposed at the same period. In consideration of financial situation, 
especially tax revenue structure, such cities as Osaka, with lower level of individ-
ual residence tax revenue source and relatively higher of corporation tax revenue 
source, could draw wider framework to concentrate cities’ authorities to regional 
level, prefectures, on the one hand, such cities as Yokohama, with relatively high-
er of individual residence tax revenue source and limited corporation tax reve-
nue source, could easily write scenarios for independence from prefectures on 
the other hand. 
  In any case, although a certain level of progress might have been achieved, it 
is anything but overcoming fundamental problems about the tax and finance sys-
tem of large cities. Taking into consideration further aging and decline of popula-
tion in the near future, large cities will face serious fiscal expansionary pressure 
to come especially in relation to social security expenses, while the growth of lo-
cal residence tax revenue will surely slow down and the amount of it per capita is 
likely to drop gradually in the long term. What is the most important thing is to 
realize the proper tax source distribution between central and local govern-
ments. The Association of Mayors of Designated Cities insists that tax distribu-
tion should be basically divided half and half between central and local govern-
ments, and then the division ratio of local tax should increase according to new 
functional sharing between center and local governments. The concept of half 
and half division was in fact originally proposed as a part of “Katayama plan” at 
the starting point of Trinity Reform, but hasn’t yet been realized. 
  Then it must be also pointed out that not only the scale of expanding reve-
nue sources generally, but the characteristics of individual financial environment 
and structure of each large city are needed to be considered.
